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Integrating Security
into the Curriculum
Computer security can be used as a vehicle
to achieve accreditation goals for computer
science and engineering programs, while at
the same time engaging students with
relevant, exciting topics. The authors’

T

approach, based on educational outcomes,
illustrates that security topics can
contribute to an engineering program by
fostering all skills required to produce
graduates capable of critical thinking.

he number of skilled practitioners of computer security who are able to address the complexities of modern technology and are familiar with successful
approaches to system security is very small. People
want security but are faced with two difficulties. First,
they do not know how to achieve it in the context of
their enterprises. They may not even know of a way
to translate organizational procedures into policies,
much less implement a set of mechanisms to enforce
those policies. Second, they have no way of knowing
whether their chosen mechanisms are effective.
The recent US Presidential Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection recommends developing education on methods of “reducing vulnerabilities and
responding to attacks on critical infrastructures.” The
commission recognizes the need to make the “required
skill set much broader and deeper in educational level
[for] computer scientists, network engineers, electronics engineers, [and] business process engineers.”1
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Broadly speaking, the engineering discipline is fundamentally designed to assure results using techniques
based on scientific principles. In terms of information
assurance and security, the goal of engineering is to
build secure systems from the outset rather than to discover that what we have built is inadequate. By moving to an educational system that cultivates an
appropriate knowledge of security, we can increase the
likelihood that our next generation of IT workers will
have the background needed to design and develop systems that are engineered to be reliable and secure.

WHAT IS COMPUTER SECURITY?
The field of computer security focuses on designing
systems that can enforce security policies even in the
presence of malicious code. One of the great difficulties of security engineering is that subverted systems
may appear to behave normally and a lack of security
may not be evident. Systems must be engineered to be
December 1998
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secure as part of their conception, design, and implementation.
The challenge is to design, develop, and deploy complex systems with confidence in their ability to satisfy
security requirements. A theory of computer security
has emerged that offers a formal method for security
engineering.2 This theory has three components: policy, mechanism, and assurance. Charles Pfleeger and
Deborah Cooper3 expand on these components by listing broad classifications of security concepts:
• Policy. Understanding the threats from which
information needs to be protected to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
• Privilege. Creating mechanisms to distinguish
and control the ability of active system entities to
access and affect system resources.
• Identification and authorization. Associating the
activities of the executing computer with individual users who may be held accountable for the
activities undertaken on their behalf.
• Correctness. Providing assurance that the hardware,
software, and systems for security policy enforcement are not susceptible to tampering or bypass.
• Audit. Creating traces and the ability to interpret
them.
The implication here is that to achieve a coherent security architecture, security must be considered from the
outset—not as an afterthought. Also, competence in
design for security policy enforcement, testing for
security, and assessment of security must be part of
the education of system implementers.

COMPUTER SECURITY IN EDUCATION
Two important criteria for selecting outcomes for
information security education are as follows:
• The education must result in graduates prepared
for the security challenges they will encounter in
their professional roles.
• The specific educational outcomes for security in
a given educational program must be consistent
with those of the larger engineering context.
It is unreasonable, however, to suggest that everybody
should know everything about security. Instead, we
propose matching appropriate knowledge and skills
with typical roles in the information society. Cynthia
Irvine identifies ten such roles,4 including software and
hardware developers, system architects, system certifiers, CERT members, and security researchers.
In the skill set specified for engineering programs
by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and
Technology, engineering programs must demonstrate
that their graduates have:
26
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1. An ability to apply knowledge of math, science,
and engineering.
2. An ability to design and conduct experiments, as
well as to analyze and interpret data.
3. An ability to design a system, component, or
process to meet desired needs.
4. An ability to function on multidisciplinary teams.
5. An ability to identify, formulate, and solve engineering problems.
6. An understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility.
7. An ability to communicate effectively.
8. The broad education necessary to understand the
impact of engineering solutions in a global and
societal context.
9. A recognition of the need for—and an ability to
engage in—lifelong learning.
10. A knowledge of contemporary issues.
11. An ability to use the techniques, skills, and modern engineering tools necessary for engineering
practice.
To understand how security topics could be used to
distinguish a computer science or computer engineering curriculum and to achieve ABET Criterion 3 goals,
we decided to focus on a set of high-level educational
objectives as the basis of a security-enhanced curriculum that would prepare students for the five roles
listed above.

Understanding objectives
A major goal in computer engineering and
computer science is to
construct computer systems or processes that
meet a desired end or
requirement. To do so,
students must learn how
to express overall system objectives.
A general goal of security is to develop computing systems that can ensure security policy
enforcement in the presence of malicious software and
abusive user behavior. This particular security goal may
encompass policy objectives for information confidentiality, integrity, or availability. In addition, the system
must provide a mechanism to hold its users accountable
for their actions through identification, authentication,
and audit. Users must have confidence that their information will, in fact, be protected within the system.
By understanding objectives, students will have the
ability to state a requirement’s purpose, significance,
and achievability and to determine the consistency of
requirements and purposes.

.

Defining problems

Reasoning empirically

The fundamental characteristic of engineering is the ability to
answer the question,
“Does this structure of
components have the
properties required for
the purpose for which
they are designed?”
Engineers ask this
question at all levels of
design, from the level
of transistors to the systems themselves.
We can define security requirements as the properties of a system that must hold during system operation. The question at each level of design becomes,
“Does this structure of components map to a security mechanism about which we can have confidence
even in the presence of malicious code?” Using formal
security policy models and specifications to provide
a chain of evidence that the implementation corresponds to policy can demonstrate the feasibility of an
actual implementation.
The formulation of appropriate questions and
problems to be solved in the context of the discipline
yields the ability to formulate questions of significance
relative to the overall purpose; to state the problem
to be solved and how it can be decomposed; and to
determine the feasibility of the problem’s solution.

Engineers often obtain
empirical results at the
lab bench by building
prototypes and measuring their performance.
These methods are also
applicable to security.
Functional interface testing, internal engineering
tests of selected subsystems, system generation
and recovery tests, and unit and module testing are all
parts of the development process for a secure system.
In the lab, prototype systems can be built and examined for security flaws. Performance issues may also
be examined by balancing expected decreases in vulnerability against user convenience and system efficiency. Techniques for assessing system vulnerability
can be used to examine real systems for genuine flaws.
The educational outcome for cultivating a focus on
empirical reasoning skills includes the ability to construct experiments or prototypes to demonstrate some
purpose or facilitate some meaningful exploration and
the ability to observe, collect, analyze, and interpret
data from experiments.

Understanding context
Concerns at the architectural level require
describing a combination of computer and
network security mechanisms to ensure a
coherent system for policy enforcement. The
software developer must
be concerned with the
use of hardware mechanisms to support these security objectives. The hardware designer, meanwhile, must attempt to construct
devices that support protection objectives while keeping in mind a wide variety of software implementations.
An appreciation of the contexts brought to bear
upon a problem through various roles permits students
to internalize the ability to design and analyze solutions to meet requirements and specifications at multiple levels of abstraction and from several viewpoints;
to understand the impact actions on one level or in one
viewpoint have on other levels or viewpoints; and to
trade off several requirements from different viewpoints in order to achieve the maximum benefit.

Synthesizing knowledge
The fundamental theories and the reasoning
techniques that allow
those theories to be
expressed define a discipline. In computer
science and engineering, the fundamental
theoretical concepts
are based on mathematics, logic, and
physics. These theoretical concepts form the principles of construction and analysis. In electrical and
computer engineering, linear systems theory is based
on sinusoidal signal composition and on superposition, which gives rise to the classical treatments of networks, controls, and communications theory.
The construction of computer hardware—and to a
lesser extent software—is based on logic, predicate
calculus, discrete math, and finite-state machine theory. In addition to applying standard mathematical
foundations to constructing hardware and software,
security includes theoretical concepts to support the
development and use of cryptography and cryptographic functions, protocols, policy models, specifications, and the use of formal methods for verification
and covert channel analysis. The means for analysis
is based on discrete math, information theory, and
December 1998
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mathematical logic such as standard predicate calculus, modal logic, and specialized belief logics.
The educational outcomes achieved through a study
of reasoning tools and theoretical results include a clear
understanding of the mathematical, logical, and physical concepts that form the analytical basis and principles of construction. They also include the ability to
apply analytical concepts and principles of construction to the analysis and construction of real systems.

Identifying assumptions
Security is never the principal objective of a system.
Systems are designed to
provide services. In this
sense, security engineering
must always take place
within the context of the
overall system objectives.
Each engineering discipline
makes assumptions regarding the various objectives of
the components, services, and properties available at
each level of design. In fact, design levels and levels of
abstraction are defined by these assumptions as well
as by the particular rules of composition used for creating structures of components.
For example, designers of authentication protocols
assume the presence of encryption functions of suitable strength. Designers of software assume the correctness of the hardware platform supporting the
instruction-set architecture. Secure system designers
may assume that the system security administrator is
trustworthy and that the compiler—placed under configuration management—does not contain artifices to
create trapdoors.
It is essential that the consistency between the
assumptions of security engineers and other engineering concerns be checked. Mismatches in design
levels, frames of reference, or applications cause inconsistent assumptions. By learning to compare differing
assumption sets, students can increase their ability to
state, justify, and check the consistency of their design
assumptions.

Identifying implications and consequences
In all engineering processes, the implications of
design decisions and system behaviors affect risk
analysis, cost, ease of manufacture, ease of maintenance, reliability, and
ethics. Determining implications and consequences
means relying on all the
28
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previous elements of ABET’s Criterion 3. Correctly
balancing consequences is sometimes called business
sense, which successful system architects and designers find to be based on experience, empirical reasoning, and conceptual reasoning coupled with a deep
understanding of intended purposes or goals.
Determining the ethical consequences of computer
use is complex but may be based on the following
three ABET Engineering 2000 Criteria:
• an understanding of professional and ethical
responsibility;
• the broad education necessary to understand the
impact of engineering solutions in a global and
societal context; and
• a knowledge of contemporary issues.
By cultivating an understanding of consequences and
implications, students can anticipate and articulate
positive and negative consequences, and can more easily judge their likelihood.

Drawing inferences
The ability to draw inferences from a great amount
of information is a skill
that must be refined
through years of practice.
While at school, students
should be encouraged to
attempt inferences. And in
terms of learning about
security, students should be
introduced to inference
techniques by being asked
to draw conclusions about systems security.
For example, security engineers make inferences in
the areas of fail-secure and secure-system recovery;
systematic penetration testing; and detection of evidence proving abusive behavior based on profiling and
audit data. These concerns are common to both security and engineering.
By focusing on inference techniques, students can
cultivate an ability to draw correct inferences based
on principles, observations, concepts, and data; to justify conclusions; and to draw conclusions that are relevant and consistent.

INTEGRATING SECURITY INTO THE CURRICULUM
Security insights must be integrated within the existing information systems programs, rather than be
treated separately. The technical aspects of security
are closely related to computer science and engineering. And many of the goals, concepts, and reasoning
techniques are similar too. Thus, two approaches are
possible:

.

• Computer security could be the focus of the curriculum, which would investigate the foundations
and technical approaches to security in considerable depth.
• A computer science or computer engineering curriculum could choose to use computer security as
an important property to be addressed in all
coursework.
Greg White and Greg Nordstrom5 have already
demonstrated the feasibility of successfully integrating security concerns into traditional courses. This
approach has the advantage of viewing security as an
integral part of computer engineering and science.
Topics appropriate to a security-oriented curriculum include security policy models; formal methods
applied to system specification, development, and
analysis; hardware and software protection mechanisms; secure system design, implementation, and testing; database security; modern cryptography;
cryptographic protocols; key management and key
distribution; auditing; identification and authentication; and coherent network security architectures.6,7
Ideally, computer science and computer engineering texts, course materials, and laboratory exercises
would have computer security completely integrated
into appropriate topics. Unfortunately, such materials do not yet exist. In the interim, however, securityrelated supplements can be used.

ware engineering students could take advantage
Security insights
of existing cryptographic libraries while buildmust
be integrated
ing a larger system.
within the existing
While learning the basics of computer architecture, students could hone their assembly laninformation systems
guage skills by experimenting with the
programs, rather
privileged instructions essential to building prothan be treated
tection mechanisms. In networking, they could
examine not only traditional communications
separately.
protocols but also algorithms and protocols for
secure communications. Through experiments
in system configuration and management, students could learn the value of well-defined procedures
to maintain the security of systems once they are operational. The notion of certified code for upgrades and
patches could illustrate concepts in authentication and
distribution of software for critical systems.
More advanced courses could ask students to consider security when designing software and networks
to support distributed simulations. Here, systems
issues relating to the protection of databases and algorithms essential to creating a secure network could be
addressed. Students could be asked questions such as,
“Where are the cryptographic keys stored and why
do you believe they are protected?” and “How will
company-proprietary information be separated from
public information and how will it be protected?” By
asking tough questions such as these, students will
appreciate the fact that security must be an integral
part of system design.

AN EXAMPLE OF INTEGRATION
In a curriculum that places considerable emphasis
on visual simulation, for example, the possibility of
including security topics may seem rather far-fetched.
Even so, security requirements rest at the heart of
every system, and visual simulation systems are no
exception. They will depend upon the security of OSs,
databases, and networks to operate properly. Core
requirements in the visual simulation curriculum
might include stochastic modeling, system simulation,
physically based modeling, and image synthesis.
Students could be required to take courses in other
basic topics, such as networking, OSs, programming
languages, and software engineering. More advanced
topics might include the use of networking for virtual
environments and systems for creating virtual worlds.
Examples, exercises, and special topics could be
used to add security concepts to both introductory
and advanced courses. For instance, in beginning programming courses, students might be given an exercise
to enter information into certificates or to check passwords. As part of a course in discrete mathematics,
students could discuss the use of Boolean arithmetic in
cryptography. A presentation on lattices could be
enlivened by showing how they can be used for formally expressing mandatory security policies. Soft-

WILL GRADUATES BE QUALIFIED?
How adequate is our plan? To answer this question, we compare our educational objectives with
remarks made by employers in the computer security
field at the 1996 IEEE CS Symposium on Security and
Privacy,8 the 1997 ACM Workshop on Education in
Computer Security (WECS 97), 9 and the 1997
National Colloquium for Information Systems
Security Education.10
All who made remarks specified that security is not
an isolated discipline but rather is part of the larger
context of engineering and computer science. Some
indicated that ethics should be part of security education. The study of ethics is already part of an engineering education and falls into the major objective
of implications and consequences. WECS 97 attendees concluded that information responsibility should
be taught well before students enter institutions of
higher education.
Several of the participants suggested that operational expertise be applicable to industry—an idea that
is covered by several elements of our approach. Many
expressed specific concerns over linking security to
several engineering activities spanning requirements,
specification, design, implementation, testing, and valDecember 1998
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idation. And there were requests that theory inform
practice and practice inform theory.
How well does the proposed framework meet the
accreditation requirements for engineering? The
accreditation criteria for electrical and computer engineering programs proposed by the IEEE refer to
ABET’s Criterion 3 listed before. Programs must
demonstrate that graduates can
• achieve the outcomes listed in Criterion 3 in three
or more areas of electrical and/or computer engineering;
• have the ability to apply the math and science necessary to analyze and design complex devices and
systems containing hardware and software; and
• have knowledge of discrete mathematics.
There are broad similarities between the educational
outcomes we expect to emerge from our approach and
ABET’s Criterion 3. Thus, including computer and
network security topics within a computer science or
engineering curriculum will provide two benefits. First,
the topics will contribute to the educational outcomes
required for ABET accreditation. Second, integrating
the topics into a computer science or engineering curriculum will add a highly relevant dimension to the
program—a feature prized by prospective employers.

T

he increasing use, reliance upon, and vulnerability of current large-scale information systems demands that more resilient, reliable, and
secure systems be built and deployed. But too few
computer science and engineering programs today
pay adequate attention to security, even though security concepts are fundamental and apply to all levels
of system and application design.
It is reasonable to ask that technically meaningful
ways be sought to integrate security into the engineering and computer science curricula charged with
the education of the majority of system designers and
implementers. An approach based on educational outcomes illustrates that security topics can contribute to
an engineering program by fostering all skills required
to produce graduates capable of critical thinking. ❖
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